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ESSAY 
 
DYNAMIC FEDERALISM: 
COMPETITION, COOPERATION AND SECURITIES 
ENFORCEMENT† 
 
By Renee M. Jones∗ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The central role of the federal-state relationship in our 
democracy is receiving renewed attention.  In part, the increased 
attention to this issue forms part of an effort by constitutional scholars to 
explain and critique the Supreme Court’s “new federalism.”  This 
discussion focuses on determining what constitutional limits, if any, exist 
on Congress’s power and whether it is appropriate for the courts to 
define and enforce such limits.1  Although the question is typically 
framed as one of constitutional interpretation, the debate inevitably 
evokes reverence for the social benefits said to flow from federalism as 
well as admonitions regarding its potential social costs. 
 At the same time as constitutional scholars struggle to discern 
the limits of Congressional authority, the recent corporate scandals and 
Congress’s swift reaction have prompted corporate scholars to re-assess 
the implications of federalism for corporate and securities law policy.  
For years corporate scholars have debated whether the laws governing a 
corporation’s internal affairs (the relationship among stockholders, 
directors and officers) were a proper province for federal regulation.  
                                                 
† Draft 10/1/2004.  Please send any comments or suggestions to 
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1 See generally Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection, 56 VAND. 
L. REV. 329; Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feely, Federalism:  Some Notes on a 
National Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 903 (1994); Larry Kramer, 
Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994). 
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Two diametrically opposed camps vigorously debated whether the 
current federal system has led to a “race to the top” or a “race to the 
bottom” in corporate law.2 
 Recent corporate scholarship has discarded the stark “either/or” 
perspective that characterizes the “race” debate.  Scholars have begun to 
examine more closely the ways in which federal securities law and state 
corporate law influence each other and interact to form a complex body 
of regulation for corporate officers and directors.3  For example, both 
Mark Roe and I have argued that the federal securities laws impose 
significant constraints on the Delaware legislature and its courts and 
therefore influence the development of corporate law at the state level.4  
Professors Robert Thompson and Hillary Sale similarly argue that civil 
litigation under the federal securities laws plays a larger role than state 
law in monitoring the conduct of officers and directors in the 
performance of their fiduciary duty of care.5   
 Although their theses differ, these recent contributions all 
emphasize the central role of federal securities law and stock exchange 
listing standards in the legal framework that creates U.S. corporate 
governance rules and standards. This recognition of the multi-layered 
dimension of corporate regulation complicates the debate about how best 
to allocate authority among state and federal regulators, extending the 
debate beyond the familiar “race to the top” or “race to the bottom” 
dialectic. 
 This essay forms part of an effort to promote a broader 
discussion about the role of federalism in corporate regulation.  It 
emphasizes the importance of competition between federal and state 
authorities in the process of developing regulation in the corporate and 
securities arenas.  Rather than seeking to establish that one level of 
government is inherently superior to the other in these matters, I argue 
 
2 For the seminal articles setting forth the opposing viewpoints, see Ralph K. 
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (race to the top) and William L. 
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663 (1974) (race to the bottom). 
3 See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of 
Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s 
Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); Robert J. Thompson & Hillary A. 
Sale, Securities Law as Corporate Governance, Reflections Upon Federalism, 
56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003); Robert J. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate 
Governance: Listing Standards, State Law and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 961 (2003). 
4 Roe, supra note xx, at 591-93; Jones, supra note xx, at 635. 
5 Thompson & Sale, supra note xx, at 904. 
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that the interaction among the regulators, filtered through the prism of 
public opinion, can help to achieve an appropriate allocation of 
regulatory authority.  I also argue that any allocation of authority must 
remain fluid so that it may shift from time to time to reflect the public’s 
revised assessments of the dominant regulator’s performance. 
 This essay builds on an argument I have presented elsewhere that 
the concept of vertical (federal-state) competition in corporate law 
should replace, or at least supplement, the outmoded horizontal (state-
state) model that currently dominates legal scholarship.6  I have argued 
that the limited federal preemption imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 20027 is a necessary component to the dynamic of vertical regulatory 
competition that helps ensure that state corporate law reflects national 
concerns, and protects the interests of groups other than corporate 
managers who dominate the state policy-making process.8  I also argue 
against complete preemption of state corporate law because state-level 
regulation may provide some advantages over federal regulation.9   
 In this Essay, I move beyond the corporate law arena to apply 
the vertical competition model to the question of how best to allocate 
authority for securities enforcement between federal and state 
regulators.10  A review of recent regulatory responses at the state and 
federal level to widespread market abuses shows how vertical 
competition can improve the performance of regulators at both levels of 
government and increase the public’s satisfaction with their 
representatives.  The rising profile of state officials as securities 
regulators and calls from certain quarters to curtail states’ enforcement 
powers thus presents a paradigm through which to explore the effects of 
vertical competition on regulatory policies and practices.   
 Although regulatory competition may sometimes spur more 
vigorous enforcement action, the political process also works to constrain 
excessive regulatory zeal and commands diverse regulators to work 
together to protect the public interest.  Lessons from these recent 
scandals show that efforts to limit states’ enforcement powers are 
misguided.  We should instead preserve a wide berth for state action in 
this field, particularly in light of public perception of regulatory 
stagnation at the national level. 
 
6 Jones, supra note xx, at 634-37. 
7 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15, 28 U.S.C.). 
8 Jones, supra note xx, at 638-39, 641. 
9 Id. at 643. 
10 Unlike the corporate law regime which is governed largely by state law, the 
federal government, acting principally through the SEC, dominates the 
regulatory system governing securities transactions in the United States. 
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 Part I of this Essay reviews the historical division of power 
between the federal government and the states in securities regulation 
and describes the preemption offensive of the 1990s which stripped the 
states of much of their regulatory authority.  Part II describes the recent 
ascension of state regulators as enforcers of securities laws.  Part III 
analyzes the effects of vertical regulatory competition and concludes that 
many benefits flow from the states’ direct challenge to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s position as the nation’s premiere securities 
enforcement agency.  Part IV considers objections to continuing 
regulatory duality and shows why they are misguided.   
 
I.  THE FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP IN PERSPECTIVE 
 
 Securities regulation has long been a key component to corporate 
governance in the United States.  For decades, the securities laws’ 
disclosure requirements, civil and criminal liability under Exchange Act 
Rule 10b-5, and the stock exchange listing standards have played a 
leading role in regulating the conduct of corporate officers and directors 
and protecting shareholder rights.  In fact, some scholars argue that the 
federal securities regime has begun to overshadow traditional corporate 
law in defining standards of conduct for officers and directors.11   
 This acknowledgement of the securities laws’ central role in 
corporate governance suggests that understanding the federal-state 
balance in securities regulation is at least as important as prescribing the 
proper relationship in traditional corporate law.  Unfortunately, however, 
the task of defining the federal-state relationship in policing securities 
fraud has received far less academic attention than the problem of 
resolving the similar division of authority over corporate internal 
affairs.12  The lack of extensive discussion of the states’ role as securities 
regulators hampers our understanding of federalism issues in corporate 
law. 
 
  A.  THE HISTORIC BALANCE OF FEDERAL AND STATE 
POWER 
 
 Defining the proper limits on the states’ power in securities 
enforcement has emerged as a policy issue because of the states’ central 
role in the investigation of two major securities scandals in recent years.  
 
11 See Thompson & Sale, supra note xx, at 861-62. 
12 A spate of articles about the role of state securities regulation were published 
from 1995 through 2000 in reaction to Congress’s 1990 reforms.  See sources 
cited infra at notes xx-xx.  However, these articles do not extensively discuss the 
allocation of power for public securities enforcement. 
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States took the lead in addressing the Wall Street analyst conflicts and 
the mutual fund trading abuses, prompting renewed debate over whether 
a uniform system of securities regulation is preferable to the current dual 
system.  To fully understand the implications of the debate, it is 
important to review the historical context in which the dual system of 
securities regulation developed, its recent demise, and its more recent 
resurgence. 
 Historically, states led the way in providing legislation to protect 
investors from exploitation by unscrupulous securities promoters.  Until 
the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) states 
were the only regulators of securities transactions.  Kansas adopted the 
first blue sky statute in 1911.13  Other states quickly followed suit, so that 
by the time Congress adopted the Securities Act, every state except 
Nevada had a securities law.14  Despite their prevalence, state securities 
laws were largely ineffective in eradicating fraud.15  The failure of state 
regulation and the abuses that preceded the Great Depression set the 
stage for the adoption of the federal securities laws.16   
 When Congress enacted the first securities statutes, it opted for a 
uniform system of national regulation, which would supplement the 
state’s securities laws already on the books.17  With the adoption of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), Congress also 
vested considerable authority in self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”), 
such as New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), and the National 
Association of Securities Dealer (“NASD”), subject to SEC oversight.18 
 The dual regulatory structure created by Congress was 
deliberate, and recognized the states’ experience and expertise in the 
field would be necessary to provide remedies beyond those which the 
 
13 State securities laws are popularly known as “blue sky” laws, reportedly 
because they were aimed at unscrupulous stock promoters who “would sell 
building lots in the blue sky.”  See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES 
REGULATION I, 36 (3d. ed 1998).   
14 Today all 50 states have a securities statute.  Id at 40-41.  
15 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 21 (4th ed. 2002). 
16 Id. 
17 The Securities Act and the Exchange Act both contain savings clauses, 
preserving the continued viability of state securities statutes.  See Securities Act 
§ 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (2004);  Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) 
(2004).   
18 See Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C.  § 78(c)(a)(26) (2004); Exchange Act § 15A, 
15 U.SC §78(f). The SROs police the activities of their members to prohibit 
manipulative and abusive practices and also maintain disclosure requirements 
and financial and conduct standards for companies that list securities for trading 
in the markets they control.  See Thompson, supra note xx, at 970. 
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new federal statutes created.19  This dual system has been criticized as 
duplicative, inefficient and overly burdensome, as it required companies 
to deal with the inconvenience of complying with federal securities laws 
in addition to the laws of every state in which they offered securities.20  
Beginning in the 1990s this dual regulatory regime was subject to a full-
scale legislative assault.21  
 
  B.  THE PREEMPTION OFFENSIVE 
 
 Criticism of state blue sky laws led first to efforts to coordinate 
federal and state exemptions.22  The objective was to ensure that if a 
securities offering satisfied the exemption requirements of one state, it 
would also satisfy similar exemption provisions adopted by all other 
states and the SEC.  Ultimately these coordination efforts failed, as true 
uniformity was never achieved.23  Business interests then successfully 
lobbied Congress to adopt the National Securities Market Improvement 
Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”),24 which prohibits states from enforcing their 
registration requirements for offerings of listed securities and most 
private placements.25  NSMIA represented the first in a series of attacks 
on state regulatory power in securities regulation.   
 
19 Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulations of Securities:  A 
Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C.L. REV. 495, 515-25 (1984); see also 
Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulations of Securities:  A 
Case for Reallocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 
504 (2000).   
20 See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-864, at 39. 
21 See, e.g., Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The Insidious Remnants of State Rules 
Regarding Capital Formation, 78 WASH U. L. Q. 407, 411-13 (2000).  Although 
in reality the regulatory system for securities trading is multi-layered, because 
this Essay focuses on the interaction between state and federal regulators I adopt 
the more conventional (though perhaps less accurate) duality concept. 
22 See Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 § 505, Pub. L. No 96-
477, 94 Stat. 2275, 2292-93 (adding Section 19(c) to the Securities Act); 
Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities 
Regulation in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 507-08 
(2003). 
23 See Campbell, supra note xx at 419-20. 
24 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 11 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
25 Securities Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(r) (2004).  NSMIA prohibits states 
from enforcing registration or qualification requirements for any “covered 
security”.  NSMIA’s definition of “covered security” includes any securities 
listed, or to be listed, on a national stock exchange or the Nasdaq National 
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 Congress preempted state power again in 1998.  This time 
preemption advocates argued that securities law suits filed in California 
were undermining the strict procedural rules mandated by the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (the “PSLRA”).26  They therefore 
lobbied for federal preemption of securities fraud actions brought in state 
court.27  Congress abided when it adopted the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”), which preempts most securities 
class actions based on state law.28   
 The prospect of federal preemption of state securities laws 
appealed to business interests only because of a complementary trend 
that had developed in the federal courts and in Congress.  This 
retrenchment trend became evident in the 1970s and has been marked by 
a series of Supreme Court decisions which have narrowed the remedies 
available to investors under the federal securities laws.29  Business 
 
Market and all securities sold under Securities Act Rule 506, the SEC’s private 
placement safe harbor. 
26 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.).  Among other reforms, the PSLRA created new lead plaintiff provisions 
for securities class actions, imposed heightened pleading standards for securities 
fraud claims, codified the “bespeaks caution” doctrine to immunize companies 
from liability for false projections, and imposed a mandatory stay on discovery 
pending a defendant’s motion to dismiss.  See DONNA M. NAGY, ET AL., 
SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 395-402 (2003).  Some 
commentators have challenged the empirical basis for the SLUSA proponents’ 
claims that state law suits were undermining the PSLRA. See Warren, supra 
note xx, at 178. 
27 See David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998:  The Sun Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. 
LAW. 1, 2 (1998); Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting State 
Private Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273 (1998). 
28  Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) codified as Securities Act §16(b), 
15 U.S.C. § 77(p)(c) and Exchange Act § 28(f) 15 U.S.C. 78(bb) (2004).  
SLUSA prohibits the litigation of any “covered class action based upon the 
statutory or common law of any State” for fraud in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a covered security.  The act defines a “covered class action” as a law 
suit seeking damages on behalf of 50 or more plaintiffs.  A “covered security” is 
defined as a security that is listed or authorized for listing on a national stock 
exchange and any other security of the same issuer of equal or higher seniority.  
Securities Act § 16(b); Exchange Act Section 28(f). See Levine & Pritchard, 
supra note xx, at 2. 
29 See Levine & Pritchard, supra note xx, at 5.  The “retrenchment” cases 
include Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) 
(establishing a purchaser-seller requirement for standing in an Rule 10b-5 case); 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (ruling that scienter is a 
required element of a Rule 10b-5 claim); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 
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interests also made headway when Congress adopted the PSLRA which 
codified many of these defendant-friendly doctrines and created 
significant new barriers to plaintiffs pursuing securities fraud claims.30  
Ironically, conservative politicians, the purported champions of states’ 
rights, advocated for preemptive legislation that severely restricted state 
power.  Despite the clear ideological consistency of this position, the 
political, economic and market environment of the 1990’s presented a 
window of opportunity apparently too enticing for the conservatives in 
power to resist.31 
  
II. THE RISE OF THE STATES 
 
  A. THE STATES’ LATENT POWER 
 
 The preemption offensive of the 1990s focused on limiting state 
authority over securities registration and private litigation of fraud 
claims.  These initiatives left intact state power to publicly enforce their 
securities fraud statutes.32  At the time, preserving the states’ 
enforcement powers was uncontroversial, because state and federal 
regulators had informally divided the world in a manner that suited 
business interests.  State regulators focused their enforcement efforts on 
pursuing small-time fraud (boiler rooms, Ponzi schemes and the like) and 
left the SEC to pursue cases of national importance.33  In the aftermath of 
the bubble-burst in which millions of individual investors lost their 
savings, this informal equilibrium faltered.  Disturbed by the notion that 
ordinary investors were being misled by self-serving analyst 
recommendations, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer began to 
 
U.S. 462 (1977) (finding no Rule 10b-5 liability for “constructive fraud” in the 
absence of false statements); Lampf, Pleva v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) 
(establishing a federal statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 actions); Central 
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) 
(eliminating aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5); Gustafson v. 
Alloyd, 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (limiting liability under Securities Act § 12(a)(2) to 
statements made in connection with a public offering). 
30 See supra note 24. 
31 See generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor 
Protection, Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies for 
Securities Fraud, 60 L. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 169 (1997) [hereinafter Warren, 
Federalism]. 
32 Securities Act § 18(c)(1); 15 U.S.C. 77r(c); see also Warren, Federalism, 
supra note xx, at 176.   
33 See Perino, supra note xx, at 279 (describing state regulators as local “cops on 
the beat” with a traditional “consumer protection” role). 
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investigate questionable industry practices that the SEC had long 
tolerated.34    
 The states’ newly aggressive posture provoked an outcry from 
business groups and prompted efforts to expand federal preemption to 
preclude states’ from enforcing their securities laws.35  A number of 
public officials lent their voices to this cause.  Supporters included SEC 
chairman William Donaldson,36 SEC enforcement chief Stephen Cutler,37 
and Congressmen Michael Oxley38 and Richard Baker.  Congressman 
Baker in his capacity as chair of the House subcommittee on Capital 
Markets led a legislative attempt to preempt state power.  He inserted a 
provision in pending securities reform legislation that would have 
prevented state regulators from enforcing state requirements against 
brokers and dealers that differed from rules established by the SEC or the 
 
34 See John Cassidy, The Investigation; How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, 
NEW YORKER, Apr. 7, 2003, at 54; see also ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE 
STREET 74-81 (2002) (describing the SEC’s inability to satisfactorily address 
analyst conflicts). 
35  See, e.g., Press Release, Securities Industry Association, SIA Welcomes NY 
AG’s Support for National Standards for Capital Markets, June 26, 2002, 
available at http://www.sia.com/press/2002_press-release/html/pr_nyag.html; 
see also Kathleen Day, Brokerage Settlement Leaves Much Unresolved: SEC 
Acknowledges Need for New, Specific Rules;  WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2003, at E1.  
Gretchen Morgenson, State Regulators Win Some, Lose Some, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
29, 2004, Sec. 3, 8. 
36 At his confirmation hearings before the Senate, Chairman Donaldson stated, 
“I think one of the great strengths of our market system is that it is a national 
market system and has not been Balkanized.” Hearing of the Senate Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs Committee: Nomination of William H. Donaldson to 
be Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, February 5, 2003.  In 
September 2003, Donaldson again warned Congress that “state law enforcement 
officials are jumping in on securities cases for political gain and may 
compromise federal investigations in the process.”  Judith Burns, Mutual Funds 
Under Fire:  SEC Warns of Uncoordinated Inquiries, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 
2003, at C14. 
37 In remarks at a Washington University Law School conference, Cutler argued 
that state enforcement power can be a problem “because Congress intended that 
the federal government, not the states, establish the rules and policies governing 
the securities markets, and that it do so on a national, rather than piecemeal, 
basis.”  Remarks of Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 81 WASH U. L. Q. 545, 552-53 (2003). 
38 In a letter to the editor of the New York Times, Congressman Oxley asserted 
that “[s]etting policy for our national capital markets is properly the duty and 
responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the self-
regulatory organizations.”  Letter from Representative Michael Oxley to the 
Editor, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2003, at Section 3, 11.   
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SROs.39  The Baker provision was ultimately withdrawn after sustained 
negative commentary from defenders of the states’ enforcement efforts.40   
 Some of the academic commentary that has addressed the states’ 
enforcement role also endorses the notion that unchecked state authority 
in securities regulation could harm the economy.41  Again, ironically, the 
very attributes of decentralization (diversity, experimentation, 
competition, etc.) that defenders of corporate federalism celebrate, are 
decried by those who advocate for a single central authority to regulate 
the national securities markets.42  
 
  B.  RECENT SCANDALS 
 
 After a string of high-profile investigations, New York and other 
states have usurped the SEC’s traditional role as the principal overseer of 
the national securities markets.  The states have repeatedly 
outmaneuvered the SEC in exposing the pervasive conflicts that seem to 
have infected the financial services industry.  The states adopted an 
agenda that extended beyond the exposure and punishment of fraud.  
They also sought to implement policy reforms to address the conflicts 
and abuses exposed by their investigations.  To this end, Spitzer and 
other state officials imposed settlement conditions that require target 
 
39 See H.R. 2179 §8(b). 
40 “Anti-Spitzer” Provision to be Removed from Bill, Reuters, Feb. 25, 2004, 
(Chicago Tribune, p. C3).   
41 See Karmel, supra note 20, at 546 (2003).  Karmel argues that, “[s]ince the 
problems are national, and in some respects international in scope, an effective 
national regulator seems more appropriate than piecemeal state regulation.”  She 
also suggests that “continued state regulation might prove costly and may lead to 
conflicting regulations; if so, the benefits to investors will be problematic”; see 
also Steve A. Radom, Note, Balkanization of Securities Regulation:  The Case 
for Federal Preemption, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 295 (2003) (arguing that preemption 
may be necessary to prevent a “Balkanized” system of securities regulation). 
42 See, e.g, Perino, supra note xx, at 278 (“None of the traditional justifications 
for allocating authority to the states applies to the regulation of private causes of 
action against issuers whose securities trade on national securities markets”);  
Stephen Bainbridge, Can you be a Competitive Federalist and Still Want Spitzer 
to Shut the #@!% Up?, Sept. 15, 2003, at 
www.professorbainbridge.com/2003/09/can_you_be_a_co.html (last visited on 
September __, 2004) (“What then are we to make of Elliot [sic] Spitzer’s 
hyperactive enforcement regime? Must we conclude that Spitzer has raced to the 
top? NO! A thousand times no! Competitive federalism only works when the 
entity being regulated has an exit option.”).   
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companies to reform their business practices. 43  As one example, Spitzer 
brokered a controversial settlement with mutual fund group Alliance 
Capital which included a condition that Alliance reduce its management 
fees by twenty percent.  The Alliance settlement precipitated a vigorous 
debate between state and federal regulators about the appropriateness of 
government intervention in setting fees for the industry.44 
 By initiating the analyst conflict and mutual fund trading 
investigations the states departed from their traditional role of policing 
petty fraud and invaded the terrain that in practice had been occupied 
exclusively by national regulatory bodies.  Prior to the states’ activism, 
the SEC’s enforcement practices were both predictable and lenient.  
More than 90% of SEC enforcement actions were resolved through 
settlement.45  In the typical settlement a target simply agreed not to 
repeat the alleged violation and perhaps paid a small fine, without either 
admitting or denying liability.46   
 State authorities, with their aggressive investigations, disrupted 
the status quo, disabling defendants’ ability to settle charges painlessly.  
The state-led investigations also cast unwelcome light on the abuse of the 
public trust by blue chip companies, inflicting serious reputational harm 
on some of the country’s most prestigious financial institutions.  With 
their reputations and goodwill at stake the regulated companies began to 
embrace the very reforms they had previously thwarted. 
 
 1. Analyst Conflicts.  Eliot Spitzer first entered the national 
spotlight with his investigation of analyst conflicts on Wall Street.  His 
investigation, conducted under the Martin Act,47 began in 2001 with a 
                                                 
43 This objective has been pejoratively described as “regulation by prosecution.”  
Karmel, supra note xx, at 520.  See generally ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION 
BY PROSECUTION (1982). 
44 See Mara Der Hovanesian & Paula Dwyer, Where Will Eliot Spitzer Strike 
Next?; New York’s Crusading Attorney General Isn’t Done with Mutual Funds -
- Or With the Rest of the Financial Services Industry, BUS. WEEK, Mar. 8, 2004, 
at 66. (discussing Spitzer’s settlement with Alliance).  Monica Langley, The 
Enforcer: As His Ambitions Expand Spitzer Draws More Controversy, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 11, 2003, A1 (quoting SEC officials as charging that “Spitzer is 
acting more like a policy czar than a prosecutor.”) 
45 NAGY, ET AL., supra note xx, at 651.  
46 Id. at  651;  JAMES D. COX, ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 772 (4th ed. 
2004).  Although a predictable pattern to enforcement activity provides certainty 
and may help facilitate capital formation, a lenient regime is unlikely to 
effectively deter fraud or check chronic abuses.   
47 New York Gen. Bus. Law, 23A [hereinafter, the “Martin Act”].  For a more 
extensive account of the Spitzer’s analyst investigation, see Cassidy, supra note 
xx. 
 
12                                 DYNAMIC FEDERALISM  October 1, 2004 
 
                                                
probe into Merrill Lynch’s analyst recommendations.  It was this 
investigation that uncovered the now-infamous e-mails that revealed that 
Merrill Lynch’s analysts (including star analyst Henry Blodget) did not 
always believe the advice they gave investors.48  These e-mails 
confirmed what many observers suspected: the analysts’ 
recommendations were hopelessly tainted by concerns with maintaining 
investment banking relationships with the firms they covered.49  
 Merrill Lynch initially resisted Spitzer’s settlement offers.50  The 
firm hired former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani to intervene on its behalf.51  
Frustrated by Merrill Lynch’s intransigence, Spitzer launched the public 
phase of his investigation into the firms’ practices.52  In a press release he 
described the case as “a shocking betrayal of trust by one of Wall 
Street’s most trusted names,” and vowed that “[t]he case must be a 
catalyst for reform throughout the entire industry.”53  The attorney 
general’s press release included excerpts from the most damaging Merrill 
Lynch e-mails.  The public release of the incriminating e-mails 
unleashed a torrent of negative media coverage.  In response to this 
intense scrutiny, Merrill Lynch acceded to Spitzer's demands and agreed 
to pay $100 million in penalties.  Merrill Lynch also agreed to a set of 
fundamental reforms which would separate its research and investment 
banking functions.54   
 The Merrill Lynch settlement was only the opening volley in 
Sptizer’s full scale investigation of Wall Street.  His office joined forces 
with the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange, and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers and other state regulators.  These 
disparate agencies worked together to conduct a comprehensive 
investigation of analyst fraud at other Wall Street firms.  The agencies 
paired up into teams, each of which investigated one or two of the 
 
48 Cassidy, supra note xx. 
49 Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch will Negotiate With Spitzer, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 15, 2002, at C1. 
50 Id. 
51 Charles Gasparino, Merrill Enlists Giuliani in Bid to Battle Spitzer, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 24, 2002 at C1.  Guiliani pleaded that Merrill Lynch had been a good 
corporate citizen that had returned to its headquarters near “ground zero” after 
the September 11 terrorist attacks. Id.  
52 Section 354 of the Martin Act permits the Attorney General to launch a public 
investigation of fraudulent practices related to securities transactions.  Martin 
Act § 354. 
53 Press Release, Office of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, “Merrill 
Lynch Stock Rating System Found Biased By Undisclosed Conflicts Of 
Interest,” Apr. 8, 2002, available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/apr08b_02.html 
54 Cassidy, supra note xx, at 54. 
 
13                                 DYNAMIC FEDERALISM  October 1, 2004 
 
leading firms.55  The investigation revealed similar conflicts at other 
firms and led to the $1.4 billion “global settlement” among 10 Wall 
Street firms, the SEC, the SROs and all 50 states.56  
 Despite public fascination with the rancor and resentment that 
bubbled between the SEC and Spitzer during the Wall Street 
investigations, the achievement of the global settlement required 
extensive cooperation, coordination and collaboration among state, 
federal and self-regulatory agencies.  By divvying responsibilities, the 
regulators were able to marshal resources effectively.  By collaborating 
in structuring a settlement, they were able to bring the investigations to 
closure, and eliminate the cloud that hung over the industry.57   
 
 2. Mutual Funds.  Less than 6 months after finalizing the 
“global settlement”, Spitzer again stunned the investment community 
when he announced a $40 million settlement with hedge fund Canary 
Capital Partners.58  Canary was charged with late trading and market 
timing in a number of mutual funds.59  Spitzer played a key role in 
bringing the mutual fund trading abuses to light.  Yet, the actions of 
another state regulator who has received less attention are equally 
enlightening.    
                                                 
55 For example, Credit Suisse First Boston was investigated by both the NASD 
and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  Cassidy, supra note xx. 
56 See Gretchen Morgenson & Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Firms are Ready 
to Pay $1 Billion in Fines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at A1.     
57 Charles Gasparino and Michael Schroeder, Pitt and Spitzer Butted Heads to 
Overhaul Wall Street Research, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2002, at A1.  
58 Randall Smith & Tom Lauricella, Spitzer Alleges Mutual Funds Allowed 
Fraudulent Trading, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2003, at A1. 
59 “Late trading” refers to illegal transactions in mutual fund shares that are 
executed after the 4:00 p.m. eastern time close of the securities markets, when 
funds typically price their shares.  “Market timing” refers to practices of certain 
fund investors who make frequent trades in mutual fund shares to exploit 
temporary disparities between the share value of a fund and the values of the 
underlying assets in the funds’ portfolio.  Although market timing is not per se 
illegal, most funds discourage such trading because it increases their costs and 
lowers returns for their long-term investors.  The prospectus disclosures of these 
funds frequently recite policies prohibiting or discouraging market timing.  The 
failure to enforce the disclosed policies could make such disclosure false and 
misleading, thereby violating Rule 10b-5, and other federal and state securities 
provisions.  See generally Statement of Richard J. Hillman, Testimony Before 
the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, SEC Operations, 
Oversight of Mutual Fund Industry Presents Management Challenges, April 20, 
2004.   
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 Massachusetts Secretary of State William Galvin outflanked the 
SEC when he opened an investigation into market timing at Putnam 
Investments, the nation’s fifth largest mutual fund complex.  This case is 
particularly instructive because Galvin followed up on a lead from a 
whistleblower who was reportedly ignored by the SEC.60  According to 
press reports, a Putnam employee and his lawyer met with 
representatives of SEC’s Boston office to report alleged market-timing in 
Putnam funds by members of certain labor unions.  When the SEC failed 
to act, the whistleblower brought his complaints to Secretary of State 
Galvin’s office.  Galvin immediately opened an investigation, which 
ultimately exposed significant market timing violations at Putnam.61  
Senior Putnam employees, including portfolio managers, had repeatedly 
engaged in market-timing transactions.62  More troubling were 
revelations that Putnam executives knew about the improper trading but 
failed to discipline the managers involved.  They also failed to report the 
employee misconduct to the funds’ trustees.63   
 In the wake of the scandal, Putnam CEO Larry Lasser was 
forced to resign as were more than a dozen other employees.64  For 
Putnam, the market impact of these revelations was equally severe.  
Investors withdrew more than $50 billion from Putnam funds, and the 
stock of parent company Marsh & McLennan dropped 14%.65 
 The SEC opened its own investigation into the abuses revealed 
by the New York and Massachusetts regulators.66  The agency also 
embarked on a comprehensive regulatory initiative to address the abuses 
 
60 Jeffrey Krasner & Andrew Caffrey, SEC Missed a Chance in its Probe of 
Putnam, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 2003, at A1.  Controversy surrounding this 
incident led to the resignation of the Juan Marcelino, Director of the SEC’s 
Boston District Office.  Jeffrey Krasner, SEC Boston Chief Quits Over Putnam:  
Office Failed to Act on Market Timing, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 2003, at A1 
61 Steve Bailey, Asleep at the Switch, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 2003, at D1 
(“While the SEC was ‘reviewing,’ Galvin’s office was acting like a real 
regulator.”).  By this time the SEC had begun to investigate Putnam in response 
to an anonymous tip to enforcement chief Stephen Cutler. 
62 Andrew Caffrey, State SEC Hit Putnam, 2 Managers Personal Profit Tied to 
Excessive Rapid Trading, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 29, 2003, at A1. 
63 Steve Bailey & Andrew Caffrey, Putnam Chief Lasser Agrees to Resign:  
Officials of Parent Firm Meet in Boston, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2003, at A1. 
64 Andrew Caffrey & Jeffrey Krasner, Putnam Fires 9 More for Improper 
Trades; A Coordinated Market Timing Effort also Revealed, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Dec. 17, 2003 at C1. 
65 By August, 2004 the volume of withdrawals had grown to $83 billion.  
Andrew Caffrey, Putnam as Pariah, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 25, 2004 at D1. 
66 Judith Burns, SEC Chief Pledges Action on Funds, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 
2003, at C19. 
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uncovered.67  The SEC reached a partial settlement with Putnam in 
November, 2003.  This agreement provoked pointed criticism from both 
Spitzer and Galvin, who complained that the SEC had “gone around 
them to cut a quick deal with Putnam.”68  Donaldson responded in kind.  
In testimony before Congress he called his critics “misguided and 
misinformed.”69  Concerned senators urged Donaldson to make peace 
with state regulators, and Donaldson promised to try work with his state 
counterparts.70 
 Ultimately, Massachusetts and the SEC did coordinate their 
efforts.  In April 2004, the state and the SEC announced a final 
settlement with Putnam.  Putnam agreed to pay $110 million in 
disgorgement and penalties, and Massachusetts won a rare admission of 
guilt in its agreement with Putnam.71 
 
PART III.  THE BENEFITS FROM VERTICAL COMPETITION 
 
  A.  THE CONCEPT 
 
The concept of competition between the state and federal 
 
67 See, e.g. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC 
Approves NYSE Governance Structure Changes; Proposes Mutual Fund 
Disclosure Rules; Solicits Comment on Fund Transaction Cost Issues, Dec. 17, 
2003, available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2003-173.htm;  SEC Release No. 
IA-2204, Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment 
Advisers, Dec. 17, 2003; SEC Release No. IC-26288, Amendments to Rules 
Governing Prices of Mutual Fund Shares, Dec. 11, 2003;  SEC Release No. IC-
26323, Investment Company Governance, Jan. 15, 2004. 
68 See Brooke A. Masters, States, SEC Split Again in Attack on Investment 
Abuses, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2003, at E1; Andrew Caffrey & Jeffrey Krasner, 
Settlement, New Trouble for Putnam; Galvin Rips Deal with the SEC, Vows 
More Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 2003, at A1. 
69 Andrew Caffrey, SEC Chief Calls Critics “Misguided”, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 
19, 2003, at D1; Deborah Solomon, SEC Chairman Defends Decision to Quickly 
Settle Putnam Charges, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2003, at D9; William H. 
Donaldson, Investors First, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2003, at 20. 
70 Senator Christopher Dodd warned Donaldson, “We can’t have you and 
Spitzer and the guy from Massachusetts screaming at each other in a public 
forum every day.”  Andrew Caffrey, SEC Chief Calls Critics “Misguided”, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 2003, at D1.  This type of sparring and bickering can 
be an unfortunate by-product of regulatory competition.  Yet, because such 
bickering plays poorly with the public it is likely to detract from each regulator’s 
standing.  Conversely, competing regulators can boost their public esteem when 
they are seen as cooperating to effectively address market abuses. 
71 Beth Healy, Putnam Agrees to $110 million Settlement: Trading Penalty is 10 
Times More than Investor Restitution, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 2004. 
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governments was part of the framers’ vision of the federalist system.72  
The framers anticipated that a dual system would allow the public to 
“giv[e] most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most 
due.”73 Thus, the framers envisioned that state and federal governments 
would compete to persuade the public as to which was better suited to 
regulate in a particular field.74   As James Madison stated in Federalist 
No. 46: 
 
[i]f . . . the people should in [the] future become more partial 
to the federal than to the State governments, the change can 
only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a 
better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent 
propensities.75 
 
In this view, vertical competition is fueled by the rival regulators’ 
desire to preserve or expand their regulatory domain by competing for 
the public’s confidence in their competence as regulators.  Such 
competition gives voters a primary role in achieving a desirable balance 
between federal and state power.  If the public becomes dissatisfied with 
a federal regulator’s performance in a substantive area, citizens can 
appeal to state regulators to address their concerns.  Conversely, if the 
public loses confidence in a state-based regime, voters can pressure 
Congress to adopt laws that either supplement or supplant state 
regulation.76   
 Certainly, our democracy functions in a more complex manner 
than this abbreviated analysis admits.  The legislative and administrative 
processes are prone to corruption, manipulation and domination by 
moneyed interests at both the state and federal levels.  Such reality 
undermines any idealistic hope that the public’s will ultimately 
determines the rules that govern our society.   
 Yet, even when we acknowledge the pitfalls of our democracy, a 
dual system of regulation should help to alleviate these dangers.  A dual 
system provides two related safeguards.  First, the existence of multiple 
layers of government makes regulatory capture a more arduous task for 
interest groups.  To influence the regulatory process at the federal level 
 
72 See Pettys, supra note xx, at 338-45 (2003) (discussing the Federalist papers). 
73 Id. at 341 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison)). 
74 Id. at 333. 
75 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), in 2 THE FEDERALIST: A 
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, WRITTEN IN FAVOUR OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AS 
AGREED UPON BY THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, SEPTEMBER 17, 1787, at 84, 85-
86 (2001). 
76 See Jones, supra note xx, at 635. 
 
17                                 DYNAMIC FEDERALISM  October 1, 2004 
 
                                                
and in 50-plus states and territories, interest groups would have to 
expend significant resources and energy.77   
 Second, in the event of capture at one level of government, the 
dual system provides an alternate venue through which citizens can seek 
to effect regulatory reform.  If a dominant regulator is controlled by 
interest groups, effecting popular reforms through that regulator would 
be difficult.  If citizens can instead seek to mobilize an “uncaptured” 
regulator (whose officials remain unconstrained by prior commitments to 
the regulated industries), reform becomes a more achievable prospect.  In 
short, regulatory dualism facilitates a more functional democracy 
because the existence of an alternative venue for reform (even when 
dormant) helps to forestall and counteract corruption.   
 
  B.  VERTICAL COMPETITION AND SECURITIES 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
 The success of the state-led securities fraud investigations and 
the SEC’s response shows how competition from a previously inactive 
sector of government can spur the dominant regulator into more effective 
action.  A comparison of Spitzer’s track record to that of the SEC in 
addressing analyst fraud demonstrates the importance of this dynamic 
relationship.  SEC chairman Arthur Levitt and his successor Harvey Pitt 
sought unsuccessfully for years to prod the brokerage firms, the SROs 
and the media to address the spiraling analyst conflicts.78  In contrast to 
the national regulators’ complaisance, Spitzer acted decisively.  His 
aggressive approach forced the powerful investment banks to the 
 
77  In corporate law the “internal affairs doctrine” assures that control of the 
regulatory process in one state is sufficient to set the national tone for corporate 
regulation.  Public choice analysis may help explain the inconsistent application 
of federalist arguments in corporate and securities law.  Capturing a small state 
such as Delaware has proven a relatively easy task.  In order to protect its 
advantages, management interests need only forestall a federal takeover.  Thus 
scholars have developed elaborate arguments in defense of the state-centered 
system.  On the other hand, because of the difficulties the financial industry has 
encountered in seeking to dominate 50 different state securities regulators, 
conservative politicians and scholars cast aside their venerable federalist 
principles and instead fervently tout the need for a “national solution” in 
securities regulation.   
78 See LEVITT, supra note xx, at 67-80 (detailing Levitt’s efforts to convince the 
NASD and the media to address analyst conflicts of interests); Charles 
Gasparino, New York Attorney General Turns Up Heat on Wall Street, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 10, 2002 at C1. 
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bargaining table and led to significant monetary penalties and business 
reforms from the industry.79 
 The Merrill Lynch and Putnam investigations are just two of 
many fraud investigations initiated by states, and ultimately resolved 
through cooperation with the SEC.80  Popular accounts of the intermittent 
sniping between the SEC and state regulators tend to classify the dispute 
as a clash of personalities fueled mainly by political ambition.81  By 
stepping back and disregarding any personality conflicts, one sees 
important implications lurking in this dramatic shift in the power from 
Washington to New York and Boston.  These cases, taken together, 
demonstrate the important benefits that can flow from invigorated 
competition between state and federal regulators.   
 
 1.   Defense Against Regulatory Capture.  Maintaining 
multiple levels of regulation provides an antidote to regulatory capture.82  
Former SEC chairman, Arthur Levitt has described the SEC of the 1990s 
as an agency hobbled by fiscal starvation at the hands of Congress.83  
Levitt reports that members of Congress repeatedly pressured his agency 
                                                 
79 Some say the penalties amount to no more than a drop in the bucket.  See, e.g., 
Lucian Bebchuk, Settling for Less, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2002, at A21. 
80 See, e.g., See In the Matter of Massachusetts Financial Services Company, 
Advisers Act Release No. 2224 (Mar. 31, 2004)(regarding cease-and-desist 
proceedings); In the Matter of Alliance Capital Management, L.P., Advisers Act 
Release No. 2205 (Dec. 18 2003) (regarding cease-and-desist proceedings); In 
the Matter of Banc of America Securities, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 
49386 (Mar. 10, 2004) (imposing remedial sanctions and cease-and-desist 
order); Pilgrim Baxter & Associates, LTD., Advisers Act Release No. 2251 
(June 21, 2004) (imposing sanctions and cease-and-desist order). 
81 See, e.g., Brooke A. Masters, States, SEC Split Again in Attack on Investment 
Abuses; Spitzer Critical of Settlement with Putnam, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2003, 
at E 01. Deborah Solomon, Its Spitzer vs. SEC on Mutual Funds’ Fees, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 19, 2003, at C1 (reporting “[a] philosophical debate over regulators’ 
role in setting mutual fund fees escalated into a showdown yesterday with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and New York Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer sniping at each other over their respective settlements with Alliance 
Capital Management Holding, L.P.”). 
82 Under capture theories of regulation, interest groups and policymakers enter 
into jointly maximizing relationships.  Under this theory smaller interest groups 
with a lot at stake can organize to exercise a distorting influence on government 
policy.  See, e.g., William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory 
Competition, Regulatory Capture and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C.L. 
REV. 1861, 1885 (1995); Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Toward and 
Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 498-
99 (1987). 
83 LEVITT, supra note xx, at 123, 132-32 
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to relent in its initiatives, and threatened to cut the SEC’s budget if Levitt 
ignored their demands.  According to Levitt, accounting firms and their 
lobbyists exerted considerable influence over the Congressional 
representatives responsible for SEC oversight.84  He describes an 
oversight structure in which his agency was kept in a stranglehold by 
representatives in the thrall of the industry they were charged with 
regulating.  Levitt’s description of a captured SEC is reinforced by 
accounts of Harvey Pitt’s performance as SEC chair.  Pitt, a former 
accounting industry lawyer notoriously promised accountants to run a 
“kinder, gentler” agency; a pledge that exposed him to charges of being 
improperly aligned with the industry.  These accounts of industry capture 
of the SEC underscore the importance of protecting the states’ role as an 
alternate jurisdiction which can counteract the pernicious effects of 
regulatory capture.   
 
 2.   Maximization of Government Resources.  A second 
benefit to maintaining multiple enforcement centers is that such a 
structure facilitates the maximization of scarce government resources.  
When multiple agencies with distinct funding sources exercise 
overlapping authority, the costs of complex investigations can be 
shared.85  The “global settlement” of the analyst investigation 
demonstrates the benefits of this strategy.  After the Merrill Lynch 
settlement, the myriad securities regulators adopted a “divide and 
conquer” strategy.  Investigators divided into teams, each of which 
investigated one or two of the firms implicated in the scandal.86  
Similarly, New Hampshire and Massachusetts joined forces to 
investigate mutual fund abuses at six fund companies located in 
Boston.87  In each of these cases, it would have been overly burdensome 
for a single regulator to complete an investigation of so many firms 
within the same time frame.88  
 
                                                 
84 Id. at 10-13, 131-139, 287-307.  A recent GAO study has also documented the 
chronic underfunding of the SEC. 
85 Mark D. Hunter, SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings:  Contemplating the 
Propriety of Recent Judicial Trends, 68 MO. L. REV. 149, 177 (2003). 
86 See Cassidy, supra note xx; Gasparino, supra note xx, at A1. 
87 BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 2003. 
88 Competing regulators might also work at cross-purposes and frustrate their 
public mission.  Ambition, self-righteousness or an ideological agenda may 
prompt a regulator to adopt an uncooperative posture.  However, such posturing 
by regulators risks alienating the public support they need to retain their 
regulatory authority. 
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 3.   Improvement in the Public’s Satisfaction with their 
Government.  Finally, regulatory competition can improve public 
satisfaction with both levels of government.89  As Spitzer took action to 
confront industry corruption, his political fortunes rose.90  The political 
failure of Congressman Baker’s efforts to limit states’ enforcement 
power reinforces the notion that the public approves of the states’ 
performance.  Press commentary on the Spitzer phenomenon also reflects 
general approval of his actions.91  Spitzer has won accolades from such 
unlikely sources as the Wall Street Journal, Fortune, and Business 
Week.92   
 Having an alternate regulator also gives investors a place to turn 
if one regulator ignores their concerns.  This benefit is starkly illustrated 
by the Putnam case, where the SEC reportedly ignored the Putnam 
whistleblower.93  The Canary Capital whistleblower also chose to contact 
Spitzer’s office rather than the SEC, demonstrating that the public has 
come to appreciate Spitzer’s reputation for responsiveness. 94  The SEC’s 
                                                 
89 As SEC enforcement chief Stephen Cutler has acknowledged, “A visible and 
aggressive state enforcement regime may motivate federal regulators, like me, to 
respond more quickly to potential securities related misconduct.  Of course if we 
in the federal government want to be the dominant securities enforcement 
authority, we must be vigilant in protecting the investing public.”  Cutler, supra 
note xx, at 551. 
90 Spitzer is one of New York State’s most popular public figures.  A 
2003 Quinnipiac University poll reported that Spitzer had the highest job 
approval rating of any New York state official. Quinnipiac University, Pataki 
Approval Inches Up, But Spitzer's Is Better, (Oct. 2, 2003) available at 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x8347.xml.  As he continued his investigations 
Spitzer's job approval ratings improved while his disapproval ratings fell. Siena 
New York Poll, The Siena New York Poll for May: Approval Ratings: New York 
State Officials, (June 16, 2004) available at 
http://www.siena.edu/sri/results/2004/040616StateOfficials.htm.  
91 Steve Bailey, Asleep at the Switch, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 2003 (“ ‘Where 
was the SEC?’ is becoming part of the lexicon”); Steven Syre, Piling on the 
SEC, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 18, 2003, at E1.   
92 Time magazine named Spitzer “Crusader of the Year” for 2002.  See Adi 
Ignatius, Crusader of the Year/Eliot Spitzer, TIME, Dec. 20, 2002, at 64; see also  
Editorial, Revenge of the Investor Class, WALL ST. J., Oct 23, 2003, at A20 
(praising Spitzer’s investigation of mutual fund trading abuses); Editorial, Eliot 
Spitzer, Once Again, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 15, 2003, at 120 (praising Spitzer). 
93 See supra text at note xx. 
94 Henny Sender & Gregory Zuckerman, Behind the Mutual Fund Probe:  Three 
Informants Opened Up, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2003.  (“Ms. Harrington [the 
Canary Capital whistleblower] decided to talk.  She said she didn’t go to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission because she wasn’t confident the agency 
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embarrassment at Spitzer’s hands caused the agency to revise its intake 
procedures so that its staff can better respond to tips and complaints from 
the public. 
 
PART IV.  OBJECTIONS TO REGULATORY DUALITY 
 
  A.  THE RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
 
 Before evaluating the arguments against maintaining regulatory 
competition in securities enforcement, we must first consider the 
characteristics of an ideal regulatory regime.  A primary objective of any 
securities regime must be to maintain justifiable public confidence in the 
integrity of the securities markets by ensuring the flow of reliable 
information to investors.  To accomplish this goal, a securities regime 
must provide investors adequate remedies for fraud and deter 
wrongdoing by promising public enforcement efforts to detect and 
punish fraud.  Such a regime can be maintained more readily when 
multiple agencies with differing strengths, resources and enforcement 
tools work together to exploit their regulatory power.95  Because the SEC 
lacks adequate resources to effectively police the national securities 
market, supplemental enforcement is essential to achieve an appropriate 
level of deterrence.96  Judicial and legislative reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s limited the deterrent effect of private securities litigation, making 
the emergence of new regulatory forces whether from states, or from a 
wave of more restrictive federal regulation (i.e. Sarbanes-Oxley) 
seemingly inevitable.97 
  
 
would follow up on her allegations.  She says she trusted Mr. Spitzer’s team, 
which had just finished its big investigation of Wall Street research analysts.”). 
95 Endowing multiple agencies with complementary enforcement power does 
not, by itself, ensure optimal cooperation.  Competition for public approval 
should push all agencies into a cooperative posture.   
96 A recent study by the U.S. General Accounting Office documents the SEC’s 
chronic underfunding.  See Statement of Richard J. Hillman, Testimony Before 
the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, SEC Operations, 
Oversight of Mutual Fund Industry Presents Management Challenges, April 20, 
2004; see also Mark Maremont and Deborah Solomon, Missed Chances:  
Behind SEC’s Failings: Caution, Tight Budget, ‘90s Exuberance, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 24, 2003, at A1 (exploring the reasons for the SEC’s recent failures in 
securities enforcement).   
97 See supra text at notes xx-xx. 
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  B.  PERCEIVED PROBLEMS WITH THE DUAL SYSTEM 
 1.  Balkanization.  Those who criticize the dual regulatory 
system for securities enforcement often warn of the ominous dangers of 
“balkanization.”98  They argue that allowing states to continue their 
independent enforcement efforts will result in a confusing patchwork of 
conduct standards throughout the nation.99  Although the term 
“balkanization” has become a favored catch phrase for state critics, a 
close examination of the law of securities fraud reveals that critics 
exaggerate when they complain of an unjustified need to comply with 50 
or more conduct standards.  The problem of “balkanization”, if it exists, 
relates mainly to enforcement policies and practices, and is not caused by 
contradictory or conflicting legal standards. 
 Contrary to the assertions of preemption advocates, similar 
standards for fraud do exist across all securities regimes, state and 
federal.  There is an inexorable connection between Rule 10b-5, the 
principal federal anti-fraud provision, and state common law of fraud and 
deceit.  The judicially-distilled elements of a Rule 10b-5 action track the 
elements of a common law action for fraud.100  In a bid for uniformity, 
the civil liability provisions of most blue-sky statutes also mirror federal 
statutory standards.101  Overall, then, securities industry participants are 
guided by uniform legal principles that prohibit making false statements 
or misleading investors.  It is of course true that the elements of proof for 
fraud are not identical under federal law and the state statutory and 
common law.  Nonetheless, careful reflection reveals the state and the 
                                                 
98 For example, Congressman Oxley warned “what we are witnessing is nothing 
less than a regulatory coup that would usurp the proper role of the SEC and the 
self-regulatory organizations.  This could result in a disastrous balkanization of 
oversight.”  Oxley, supra note xx; see also Cutler, supra note xx, at 550 
(arguing “our mutual goal should be to avoid “re-balkanizing” . . .  the securities 
markets, and effectively, undoing the work Congress has done.”); Michael S. 
Greve, Free Eliot Spitzer!, FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, AEI ONLINE, at 
www.aei.org/include/pub_print.asp?pubID=13928. (“The strongest argument for 
federal intervention is that it constitutes the only alternative to regulatory 
balkanization.”). 
99 Congressman Baker accused Spitzer of a “failed attempt to usurp federal 
rulemaking and oversight” that would “cause confusion in the markets.”  Ben 
White, Lawmaker Vows to Thwart Spitzer, WASH. POST, May 24, 2002, at E01.   
100 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
101 Forty states have adopted either the 1956 Uniform Securities Act or the 
Revised Uniform Securities Act of 1985.  The anti-fraud provision of both 
versions of the Uniform Securities Act (and new Uniform Securities Act of 
2002) are substantially the same as Rule 10b-5.  LOSS & SELIGMAN I, supra note 
xx, at 43. 
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federal governments speak with one voice in establishing a conduct 
standard for securities issuers and their representatives.  The states 
emergence in the securities enforcement arena has not changed the 
prevailing legal standard.  It has only altered the prior reality that federal 
and state authorities rarely imposed serious penalties against major firms 
for securities fraud.102   
 Although there is a fairly uniform standard of conduct under all 
securities laws, jurisdictions vary widely in the resources they devote to 
policing securities fraud.103  There are also important variations among 
jurisdictions in available enforcement tools and the range of remedies for 
misconduct.  These variations mean that the risks of detection and 
punishment for fraud can vary from one jurisdiction to the next.   
 New York’s Martin Act, for example, is singular in granting the 
Attorney General broad investigatory powers and in limiting the rights 
afforded to subjects of an investigation.104  In addition, an action for 
fraud under the Martin Act does not require the Attorney General to 
establish the defendant’s intent to defraud.105  These differences (and, of 
course, the willingness to exploit them) likely explains the contrasting 
outcomes of state and federal regulatory efforts.106  The fact that the SEC 
joined Spitzer and Galvin in the analyst and mutual fund investigations 
supports the proposition that the conduct targeted by the states also 
breaches the federal securities laws.   
 
102 Before its conviction for obstruction of justice in connection with Enron’s 
collapse, Arthur Andersen had been the subject of a number of major SEC 
enforcement actions for falsely certifying its clients’ financial statements.  
Andersen settled the SEC’s investigation of the $1.7 billion fraud at Waste 
Management by paying a modest fine and agreeing to an injunction against 
future violations.  Andersen was later implicated in four of the major accounting 
frauds of 2002, including Qwest, Global Crossing, Enron and WorldCom.  See 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn:  Heavy Rhetoric, Light 
Reform (And it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 926 (2003).   
103 LOSS & SELIGMAN I, supra note xx, 147-50, n. 336 & 337. 
104 Martin Act §§ 353.2-3; 353-1; and 354.  Under the Martin Act, a subject of 
an Attorney General’s investigation must comply with the Attorney General’s 
subpoena, and the failure to comply constitutes prima facie evidence of 
fraudulent conduct.  In addition, a subject of an investigation has no right to 
have an attorney present during questioning (although Spitzer has allowed 
attorney presence). LOSS & SELIGMAN I, supra note xx, at 75-82; see also 
Cassidy, supra note xx. 
105 People v. Federated Radio Corp, 244 N.Y. 33 (1926).  In contrast, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has ruled that scienter is an essential element for a securities 
fraud claim under Rule 10b-5.  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 
(1976). 
106 See supra text at notes xx – xx. 
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 Few of Spitzer’s critics have argued publicly that the disgraced 
securities analysts and market timers complied fully with federal 
securities laws, or that their legal problems can be traced to conflicting 
state and federal conduct standards.  Instead they seem to advance a 
defense based on the industry’s “detrimental reliance” on regulatory 
inaction, by positing that federal regulators’ prior tolerance of alleged 
misconduct, makes it unscrupulous for state regulators to enforce their 
anti-fraud provisions.  
 Rather than explicitly advance this untenable argument, critics 
instead launch ad hominem attacks against Spitzer as they warn about the 
crippling of the system of capital formation caused by requiring 
companies to comply with fifty different legal standards.107  These critics 
conveniently ignore the reality that unchecked fraud, once revealed, does 
more to weaken capital formation, than does a vigorous system of 
enforcement.108 
 
 2.  Unfairness of Parallel Proceedings.  Critics also argue that it 
is unreasonable for companies to have to answer to multiple regulators 
investigating the same conduct.109  This argument also fails to withstand 
scrutiny.  Complexities associated with parallel enforcement 
investigations110 extend beyond the context of securities fraud, and are 
inevitable in our federal system of government. State and federal 
enforcement authority frequently overlaps in areas ranging from crime 
                                                 
107 See Oxley, supra note xx; Ben White, Lawmaker Vows to Thwart Spitzer; La. 
Congressman Decries State Move, WASH. POST, May 24, 2002 at E01(quoting 
Congressman Richard Baker); Bainbridge, supra note xx. 
108 See Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 713 (1996).  Stout argues that 
“[w]hen securities scholars get together, they often find they agree on very little. 
But there is one thing they do agree on: fraud is very, very bad for securities 
markets.  In lay terms, fraud is bad for securities markets because it erodes 
investor confidence.  This occurs because fraud makes it difficult for investors 
to detect differences in the quality of the securities they buy.  Companies issuing 
bad securities--poorly run firms that throw away money and do a poor job for 
their investors--can sell their securities at about the same price as well-managed 
firms, because fraud makes it impossible for investors to easily distinguish 
between high-quality and low-quality firms.” Id. 
109 See Oxley, supra note xx (describing the need to “cut a separate deal with 50 
state regulators”). 
110  Abbe David Lowell and Kathryn C. Arnold, Corporate Crime after 2000:  A 
New Law Enforcement Challenge or Déjà vu? 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 219, 233 
(2003) (“Parallel proceedings are simultaneous or successive investigations, 
prosecutions, or other actions by federal and state governmental departments or 
agencies or by a governmental entity and a private party.”). 
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and drug enforcement to the environment and workplace safety.111  In all 
of these areas, state and federal regulators have found ways to cooperate 
to fulfill their public duties.112  The SEC, in particular, has extensive 
experience in inter-agency cooperation because it must coordinate any of 
investigations with a criminal component with the U.S. Justice 
Department. 
 Although targets understandably bristle at being subject to 
parallel investigations, the regulators have demonstrated their ability to 
coordinate action, despite occasional rivalries and differing policy 
perspectives.  Targets do suffer a tactical disadvantage when multiple 
investigations co-exist.113  The corresponding advantage to government 
regulators enhances their ability to protect the public interest.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 State regulators emerged as significant securities enforcement 
agents only because of the prolonged failure of the SEC and the SROs to 
competently confront systemic problems affecting the financial services 
industry.  The SEC’s inaction created a vacuum that state regulators 
moved to fill.  The states’ actions, in turn, have prompted the SEC to 
address squarely the chronic abuses exposed by the states, through a 
combination of regulatory and enforcement efforts.  This pattern of 
actions and reactions by state and federal regulators illustrates how 
vertical regulatory competition can lead to more effective government 
regulation.  Efforts to limit states’ enforcement power are not only 
misguided, they are also contrary to the framers’ vision of our 
democracy. 
 
111 For discussions about, and proposed solutions to, the challenges of 
concurrent enforcement in various fields see generally Jamie S. Gorelick & 
Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Federalization Debate, 46 
HASTINGS L. J. 967 (1995) (discussing criminal law enforcement); John C. 
Dernbach, Pennsylvania’s Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act: An Assessment of How “Cooperative Federalism” Can Make 
State Regulatory Programs More Effective, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 903 (1986) 
(discussing environmental law); Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative 
Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429 
(1984) (discussing health and safety regulation). 
112 Gorelick & Litman, supra note xx, at 976-78. 
113 See Lowell & Arnold, supra note xx, at 234 (“Parallel proceedings change 
everything about the planning and strategy of a case.  Whether to allow a client 
to testify in a civil deposition or before a congressional committee for example 
is a much different question when there is a grand jury just waiting to review a 
copy of that testimony.”). 
